Consciousness: A Real Mystery by Demircioglu, Erhan
 







               
The question I will address in this paper is an old one, whether consciousness 
is a real mystery, a mystery about the fabric of our universe itself. This question is, as 
will become clear, intimately tied to the question why consciousness appears to be a 
real mystery. If consciousness is not a real mystery but only appears to be so (that 
is, if what I will call “appearance mysterianism” is true), as many philosophers tend 
to believe, then we face the question – “the illusion question” – why consciousness 
appears to be a real mystery when, in fact, it is not. Without an adequate answer to 
the illusion question, appearance mysterianism is undermined. And, as I will argue, 
the attempts currently available to answer the illusion question fail, which should 
rationally incline us away from appearance mysterianism and towards “de re 
mysterianism”, the view that consciousness is a real mystery.  
 
1 Consciousness: A Curious Phenomenon 
 
I am a conscious body but the cup lying motionless on my desk is an 
unconscious (or, more adequately, non-conscious) thing. I have sensations, feelings, 
and thoughts; the cup has no sensations, feelings, or thoughts. This striking 
difference between me and the cup cries out for an explanation: what is it that 
explains why I am, but the cup is not, conscious? It seems that it must be the case 
that I am conscious in virtue of something, some property the body I am has. And, it 
must be the case that the cup is non-conscious in virtue of lacking something, some 
property it fails to have. It cannot be a brute, inexplicable fact that I am conscious but 
the cup is not. There must be something that explains why I am conscious and the 
cup is not; and, setting aside super-natural interventions (a practice that I will follow 
throughout the paper), the explanation must have to do with the body I am and the 
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difference that explains why I am conscious but the cup is not. 
 The mind-body problem springs from the observation that there seems to be 
nothing in my body that might explain why I am conscious (or have conscious states). 
Surely, a certain part of me, my brain, is remarkably different from the parts of the 
cup, however you wish to carve it, and there are good reasons to think that my being 
conscious is intimately tied to my having a brain. Taking a strong hit on the head, I 
might go blind, lose the capacity to have olfactory experiences or, even more 
unfortunately, turn totally unconscious. This points to the fact that there is a 
correlation (or perhaps even a causal relation) between my being conscious and 
(some of) my brain states, viz. that my brain is, so to speak, the seat of my 
consciousness. Of course, however, my brain’s being the seat of my consciousness 
does not explain why it is the seat of my consciousness (it does not explain itself!). 
Furthermore, and more significantly, the question of what it is in my body that 
explains why I am conscious can be reformulated, without losing its force, as the 
question of what it is about my brain that explains why my brain is the seat of my 
consciousness. There is a correlation between (some of) my brain states and my 
being conscious, while there is no correlation between any of the states of the parts 
of the cup and its being conscious (simply because the cup is not conscious). But 
why? There must be something about my brain in virtue of which it is the seat of my 
consciousness, what is it? The problem is that there seems to be nothing special, or 
at least special enough, about my brain that explains why it is the seat of my 
consciousness. At a micro-physical level, my brain is just a swarm of atoms 
organized in a certain way, and it is rather difficult to see how the organization of 
atoms can give rise to consciousness. At a macro-physical level, my brain is just a 
kind of meat, and it is again rather difficult to see how a kind of meat can be 
conscious. So, despite the uncontroversial fact that we can point at some differences, 
at both levels, between my brain and the cup, it does not seem that those differences 
are capable of explaining what it is about the former that makes me conscious and 
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2 De Re Mysterianism 
 
There is thus no question that consciousness appears mysterious. Does it 
follow that consciousness is mysterious? The answer is no. The possibility that there 
is something in my body that explains why I am conscious is compatible with the fact 
that it appears that there is nothing in my body that explains (or could explain) why I 
am conscious. Perhaps, it only appears to us (or maybe even to conceiving minds in 
general) that consciousness is mysterious, whereas it is in reality as mundane and 
unexceptional as other products of our bodies such as bile.  
Let us call the thesis that consciousness is (and not merely appears to be) 
mysterious “de re mysterianism”. A nice thing about de re mysterianism is that it 
provides a plausible and straightforward explanation of why consciousness seems 
mysterious: the answer is, according to de re mysterianism, that consciousness is 
mysterious. The real mysteriousness of consciousness, on this view, explains why it 
seems mysterious. The mysterious appearance, in this case, is simply a reflection of 
something real, the mysterious reality itself. However, despite this explanatory 
advantage, it is hard to believe that de re mysterianism is true because to believe that 
consciousness is mysterious (that is, to believe that there is no explanation of 
consciousness in terms of bodily features) is to believe that nature is miraculous 
(that there are things in nature that simply happen, without there being an explanation 
of their occurrence in terms of more fundamental things). Can we really believe, given 
our current understanding of how it actually works, that there are miracles in nature? 
It is, to say the least, hard to believe that de re mysterianism is true; however, 
I will attempt to show in this paper that that is the conclusion towards which we are 
inescapably driven. My argument is, briefly put, that the alternative to de re 
mysterianism, which I will call “appearance mysterianism”, fails to provide an 
adequate answer to a particular question, a question it needs to answer in order to 
be a viable option. And, it is the very failure of appearance mysterianism that should 
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3 Appearance Mysterianism 
 
Appearance mysterianism is the thesis that combines the de re non-
mysteriousness of consciousness with the apparent mysteriousness of 
consciousness. Note that appearance mysterianism is a weak position: it simply 
recognizes that consciousness seems mysterious (that, it seems that there is no 
explanation of consciousness in terms of bodily features) and maintains that 
consciousness is not mysterious (that there is indeed an explanation of 
consciousness in physical terms). Anyone who satisfies these two conditions (and 
only these two conditions) is an appearance mysterian. 
 Appearance mysterianism faces a central challenge and needs to answer a 
central question. Let me first spell out the challenge. If it seems to us that there is 
nothing in our bodies that can be appealed to in the quest for an explanation of 
consciousness, as appearance mysterianism says it does, then what good reason do 
we have to think that there is something in them that can be appealed to in such a 
quest? Is not the failure to pin down that very thing, whatever it is, that explains 
consciousness, a reliable indicator that the insistence that the mystery of 
consciousness is merely apparent is bound to look, sooner or later, as an instance of 
unreasonable stubbornness? If the appearance of a mystery is a defeasibly good 
reason for its reality, as it seems to be, then unless the force of the appearance is 
defeated, the reasonable attitude seems to be to believe in the reality of the mystery. 
So, the challenge for appearance mysterianism is to reconcile its two defining 
conditions that pull in opposite directions. I dub this challenge the stability challenge.  
Now, here is the question that appearance mysterianism must answer: why 
does consciousness seem mysterious, if it is not mysterious? Why does it seem to us 
that there is nothing in our bodies that can be appealed to in the quest for an 
explanation of consciousness, while there is in fact something in our bodies that suits 
the job? What is it that explains the illusion that the physical matter seems utterly 
incapable of making the existence and character of consciousness intelligible? The 
relief provided by appearance mysterianism that consciousness is not mysterious is 
immediately accompanied with the question of what it is that makes it appear 
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A satisfactory response to the stability challenge requires that the appearance 
mysterian find a way to support the idea of the non-mysteriousness of 
consciousness while defeating the support the apparent mysteriousness of 
consciousness provides to the idea of mysteriousness of consciousness. A 
satisfactory response to the illusion question requires that the appearance mysterian 
explain the apparent mysteriousness of consciousness in a way that is consistent 
with the idea that it is not mysterious. The former involves the task of defeating the 
support the appearance provides to the idea of mysteriousness of consciousness, 
and the latter the task of explaining why there is such an appearance in the first place. 
Thus formulated, the challenge and the question are at least notionally different. 
However, it is important to realize that a satisfactory response to the illusion 
question automatically qualifies as a proper part of a satisfactory response to the 
stability challenge. That is, if the apparent mysteriousness of consciousness is 
explained in a way that is consistent with the idea that it is not mysterious, then the 
support the apparent mysteriousness of consciousness provides to the idea of 
mysteriousness of consciousness is thereby defeated. This is because the support 
in question is plausibly conditional on there being no explanation of the appearance 
in question other than the explanation in terms of the real mystery of consciousness.  
The kind of defeat that would be at work if the illusion question were answered 
is what is called “undercutting defeat.” Here is a paradigmatic case of undercutting 
defeat. I enter my friend’s reading room and have an experience as of seeing some 
red books. My experience provides support to the belief that there are red books in 
the room. However, my friend later informs me that the books in the room are 
intricately illuminated by red light. My friend’s testimony is not evidence that there 
are no red books in the room; however, it still defeats the support my experience 
provides to the belief that there are red books. But why exactly is the belief defeated? 
A plausible answer is that, given my friend’s testimony, there are now two different 
ways available to me in which my having an experience as of seeing some red books 
can be explained: one appeals to the books’ being red, and the other appeals to the 
lightning conditions. So, the support my experience at hand provides to the belief that 
there are red books is defeated by my friend’s testimony because my friend’s 
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this case, the support my experience provides to the belief is undercut. It must be 
clear that analogous considerations apply to the consciousness case. If the apparent 
mysteriousness of consciousness can be explained in a way consistent with the idea 
that it is not mysterious, then the support the appearance in question provides to the 
idea of mysteriousness of consciousness is undercut.  
It might be argued that even though a response to the illusion question 
automatically qualifies as a proper part of a response to the stability challenge, a 
response to the stability challenge does not require a response to the illusion 
question. This is because, it might be further maintained, a response to the stability 
challenge requires only that the support the apparent mysteriousness of 
consciousness provides to the idea of mysteriousness of consciousness be 
defeated. Moreover, since undercutting defeat, the kind of defeat that would be at 
work if the illusion question were answered, is only one of two main kinds of defeat 
(the other one being “rebutting defeat”), it might be claimed that the other kind of 
defeat might be attempted in the search for a response to the stability challenge. And, 
if the stability challenge can be met without answering the illusion question, then it 
might be argued that however interesting that question is and however preferable it 
would be to answer it, appearance mysterianism is not required to answer it in order 
to be a satisfactory position. And, this is because, it might be thought, once the 
support the apparent mysteriousness of consciousness provides to the 
mysteriousness of consciousness is defeated, there is nothing more about that 
appearance that makes it problematic regarding the plausibility of appearance 
mysterianism.  
I believe that this is a mistake. I agree that the support the apparent 
mysteriousness of consciousness provides to the idea of mysteriousness of 
consciousness might be defeated without being undercut. More specifically, it might 
be rebutted without being undercut. However, I also hold that such a defeat would 
not render appearance mysterianism stable. So, without answering the illusion 
question and thereby undercutting the support in question, the stability challenge 
cannot be adequately met: the defeat in question must be of a particular, viz. 
undercutting, kind. 
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an extra piece of evidence that not-p. Here is a case. Suppose that, as in the previous, 
undercutting case, I enter my friend’s reading room and have an experience as of 
seeing some red books. Suppose further that in this case, my trustworthy friend, with 
an authoritative tone of voice, tells me that there are no red books in the room (and 
perhaps adds that it merely appears that there are). In this case, and unlike in the 
previous case, my friend’s testimony is evidence that there are no red books, while 
my experience is evidence that there are. The two combined, it seems that my total 
evidence does not support the belief that there are red books (or the belief that there 
are no red books). In this case, the support my experience provides to the belief that 
there are red books is rebutted by my friend’s testimony. But it is not undercut 
because even after my friend’s testimony, my experience still continues to support 
the belief that there are red books. 
So, the support the apparent mysteriousness of consciousness provides to the 
idea of mysteriousness of consciousness might be rebutted by considerations in 
favor of the idea of non-mysteriousness of consciousness. One such consideration, 
for instance, is known as the causal argument. The argument starts with the premise 
that the physical world is “causally closed” in the sense that every physical effect has 
a sufficient physical cause. It continues with the assertion that mental (conscious) 
events have physical effects (e.g., that I feel thirsty causes my reaching the bottle). 
The conclusion is that conscious events must be physical events (assuming that 
there is no causal over-determination). The causal argument is an argument in favor 
of the idea of the non-mysteriousness of consciousness and thus rebuts the support 
the apparent mysteriousness of consciousness provides to the idea of 
mysteriousness of consciousness.  
However, rebutting defeat is a double-edged sword: the support provided to p 
by E is rebutted by E´ just in case the support provided to not-p by E´ is rebutted by 
E. So, if the support the apparent mysteriousness of consciousness provides to the 
idea of mysteriousness of consciousness is rebutted by the causal argument, then 
the support the causal argument provides to the idea of non-mysteriousness of 
consciousness is also rebutted by the apparent mysteriousness of consciousness. 
This means that appearance mysterianism can hardly find relief in the fact that the 
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provides to the idea of mysteriousness of consciousness. This is because the rational 
attitude on that very fact taken by itself is not to believe that the mystery of 
consciousness is merely apparent but to suspend judgment regarding whether it is 
merely apparent or real. 
The overall lesson is that in order to meet the stability challenge, the defeat in 
question must be of the undercutting kind and that in turn can be provided by (and 
plausibly, only by) answering the illusion question. So, the stability challenge cannot 
be met without answering the illusion question. An adequate answer to the illusion 
question does not only automatically qualify as a proper part of an adequate 
response to the stability challenge but it is also required for such a response. Let us 
then examine some answers provided by the appearance mysterians to the illusion 
question.  
 
4 The Illusion Question 
 
An adequate answer to the illusion question must meet three conditions at 
once: it must account for the depth of the (so-called) merely apparent mystery 
without abandoning the idea that it is apparent after all and also without replacing 
that apparent mystery by some other, equally challenging (apparent) mystery. The 
danger awaiting the appearance mysterian here is that if the apparent 
mysteriousness of consciousness proves to be resistant to be tamed by the physical, 
then the temptation to appeal to something really mysterious or to bring in some 
novel apparent mysteries grows higher, a temptation which one might 
unsuspectingly yield to. The more resistant to a non-mysterious explanation the 
apparent mysteriousness is, the bigger the temptation to account for it by an appeal 
to a real mystery will be. 
 Among the three conditions mentioned, what I will, for obvious reasons, call 
“the no-abandonment condition” and “the no-replacement condition” are self-
explanatory; and, let me make a couple of remarks about the third one, what I will call 
“the depth condition”. How deep is the apparent mysteriousness of consciousness? 
How strongly resistant does consciousness appear to be to an explanation in terms 
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explanation of consciousness look? It certainly appears to us that consciousness is 
mysterious; and the question about the depth of the appearance is a question about 
whether the appearance itself appears temporary or permanent. Does it look as if 
there is nothing that blocks in principle a physical explanation of consciousness? Or, 
does it look as if our current lack of a physical explanation is a symptom of something 
that runs deeper? 
 I take it that the apparent mysteriousness of consciousness is as deep as the 
apparent mysteriousness of any given phenomenon can get. It is not merely that we 
currently have no physical explanation of consciousness but also that we don’t even 
have the beginnings, however rough and rudimentary they might be, of such an 
explanation. Even more depressingly, we don’t have a clue about how to make a start 
on this front that at least has a glimmer of promise. It is true that we know more, 
much more, about the brain than we did, say, a hundred years ago; however, the 
central philosophical question also keeps standing as perplexing as it was a hundred 
years ago: what does this (physical event) matter have to do with that (conscious 
event)? So, I take it that what the appearance mysterian needs to account for is not 
merely why consciousness appears to be currently unaccountable in physical terms 
but also, and more substantially, why it appears to be unaccountable in principle in 
such terms (that is, unaccountable in physical terms that we can possibly master). 
 Let me now move on to assessing three different answers offered by the 
appearance mysterians to the illusion question. One answer is that the reason why 
consciousness appears mysterious even if it is not mysterious is that we don’t yet 
know enough the brain. According to this answer (which I shall call “the ignorance 
answer”), the apparent mysteriousness of consciousness is temporary, and there is 
no good reason to think that it will not vanish when we learn more about the workings 
of the brain. The ignorance answer has the potential to explain why consciousness 
appears to be currently unaccountable in physical terms; however, it does not explain 
why it appears to be unaccountable in principle in such terms. In fact, it simply 
misjudges and does not take seriously the depth of the apparent mysteriousness of 
consciousness and thus fails to appreciate what needs to be explained. It is trivially 
true that if we attain an explanation of consciousness in physical terms in the future, 
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not explain why it now appears to us that such an explanation of consciousness is in 
principle unattainable. The ignorance answer does not satisfy the depth condition 
and thus is inadequate. 
 A different and more popular answer among appearance mysterians to the 
illusion question takes the apparent mysteriousness of consciousness seriously. 
According to this answer, the reason why it now appears to us that a physical 
explanation of consciousness is in principle unattainable is due to the fundamentally 
different way we conceive and conceptualize some of the physical states of our 
brains. There are no non-physical (or non-functional) states of the brain, so a given 
state of a brain is as susceptible to an explanation as any physical state we can 
observe in the nature is. However, the answer goes, we conceptualize some of those 
brain states in a rather peculiar way, phenomenally; and, what explains why a 
physical explanation of consciousness is in principle unattainable is that 
phenomenal conceptualizations of those brain states are what we appeal to when we 
talk about consciousness and also that phenomenal conceptualizations are 
fundamentally disconnected from physical conceptualizations of those states. A 
phenomenal conceptualization of a brain state has no a priori links to its physical 
conceptualization, and it is therefore no wonder, according to this answer, that we 
balk at and feel perplexed by the question “how can we explain this (conceived 
phenomenally) in terms of this (conceived physically)?” However, consciousness is 
simply a constellation of physical brain states, albeit conceived phenomenally, and it 
is capable of receiving as much physical explanation just as any other. Let us call this 
answer to the illusion question “the phenomenal answer”. 
 The phenomenal answer evidently meets the depth condition: it accounts for 
why it appears to us that a physical explanation of consciousness is in principle 
unattainable. The way we conceptualize some physical states is what is responsible 
for the appearance in question. Given our phenomenal conceptualization of those 
states, the mysterious appearance is bound to occur. Furthermore, the phenomenal 
answer meets the no-abandonment condition: the mysteriousness of consciousness 
is merely apparent according to this answer because consciousness is physical. 
However, it fails to meet the no-replacement condition: the phenomenal answer 
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phenomenal conceptualization; however, that we have such a peculiar 
conceptualization of some physical brain states but not the others itself appears to 
be mysterious. Why do we conceptualize some physical brain states phenomenally 
while others are not susceptible to such a conceptualization? There seems to be 
nothing special in those physical states that we conceptualize phenomenally, no 
special physical feature that distinguishes them from the rest that we don’t 
conceptualize phenomenally. So, on the phenomenal answer, the apparent 
mysteriousness of consciousness is explained only at the cost of creating a novel 
mysterious appearance, viz. the apparent mystery that we conceptualize only some 
physical brain states phenomenally while it seems that there is no relevant difference 
between those brain states and the rest which can explain this conceptualization 
feat. 
 The final answer I will consider to the illusion question agrees with the 
phenomenal answer that something more fundamental than a mere appeal to our 
ignorance is required to explain the apparent mysteriousness of consciousness. 
According to this answer, however, the reason why it appears to us that a physical 
explanation of consciousness is in principle unattainable has ultimately to do with a 
peculiar feature of our brains (rather than with a peculiar feature of our 
conceptualizations). The main intuition guiding this answer is that the 
acknowledgment that there must be something about the brain, a certain property of 
the brain, that explains why and how this (brain state) gives rise to that (conscious 
state) requires that that property be radically different from the other properties of 
the brain that we know and as we know them. This is because ordinary physical 
properties don’t appear to be capable of rising up to the challenge of giving such an 
explanation. Ordinary physical properties of the brain aren’t just cut out for the job; 
and, according to the thesis at hand, which I will call “the extra-property answer”, we 
need to posit something extraordinary, an extraordinary property of the brain for an 
extraordinary explanatory mission, viz. that of explaining the fact that we are 
conscious. The extraordinary property in question must satisfy two desiderata: it 
must be something radically different from other properties of the brain, so different 
in a way that makes it capable of explaining consciousness, while still being a 
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 The extra-property answer to the illusion question satisfies the depth 
condition: if the extra-property answer is right, then the reason why it appears to us 
that a physical explanation of consciousness is in principle unattainable is that such 
an explanation must make reference to the extraordinary property of the brain and, 
given its extraordinary nature, that property might well fall beyond our cognitive 
reach. However, it fails to meet the no-abandonment condition: the extra-property 
answer explains the apparent mysteriousness of consciousness by an appeal to 
there being an extraordinary property of the brain, a property that differs radically 
from ordinary properties of the brain. The extraordinary property in question is simply 
a real (and not merely apparent) mystery built right into the heart of nature: to 
acknowledge that there is such an extraordinary property is to acknowledge that 
there is a real mystery. The extra-property answer invokes something really 
mysterious to account for the apparent mysteriousness of consciousness, a move 
that in effect commits that answer to treating, at one remove, consciousness itself 
as a real mystery. 
 We have assessed three different answers to the illusion question and found 
them wanting. Absent any other answers currently available, it is fair to draw the 
conclusion that consciousness is a real mystery, however unbelievable that might 
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